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Transient nature of cooperation by 
pay-it-forward reciprocity
Yutaka Horita1,2, Masanori Takezawa3,4, Takuji Kinjo3, Yo Nakawake3 & Naoki Masuda5
Humans often forward kindness received from others to strangers, a phenomenon called the upstream 
or pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity. Some field observations and laboratory experiments found 
evidence of pay-it-forward reciprocity in which chains of cooperative acts persist in social dilemma 
situations. Theoretically, however, cooperation based on pay-it-forward reciprocity is not sustainable. 
We carried out laboratory experiments of a pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity game (i.e., chained gift-
giving game) on a large scale in terms of group size and time. We found that cooperation consistent with 
pay-it-forward reciprocity occurred only in a first few decisions per participant and that cooperation 
originated from inherent pro-sociality of individuals. In contrast, the same groups of participants 
showed persisting chains of cooperation in a different indirect reciprocity game in which participants 
earned reputation by cooperating. Our experimental results suggest that pay-it-forward reciprocity is 
transient and disappears when a person makes decisions repeatedly, whereas the reputation-based 
reciprocity is stable in the same situation.
In December 2012, a customer generously paid for coffee for the next stranger customer in a Tim Hortons 
drive-through in Winnipeg. Subsequent customers did the same act such that a chain of generous behavior even-
tually involved 228 customers1. Similar phenomena have been witnessed in other shops2–5. This form of coop-
erative behavior, cooperating with a stranger after receiving cooperation from a different individual, is referred 
to as pay-it-forward reciprocity, also known as upstream reciprocity and generalized reciprocity. Pay-it-forward 
reciprocity has been observed in humans in some behavioral experiments6–11 and fields12, and also in rats13.
Pay-it-forward reciprocity is one of the two forms of indirect reciprocity, in which one would cooperate with 
strangers even when not to cooperate is apparently more lucrative (i.e., social dilemma situations). Indirect rec-
iprocity is considered to enable large-scale cooperation in a population in which it is practically impossible for 
all individuals to be acquainted with each other14,15. Theoretically, cooperation under pay-it-forward reciprocity 
is stable only when it is combined with other stand-alone mechanisms of cooperation such as direct reciprocity 
(i.e., repeated interaction)16, spatial networks16, heterogeneous networks17, networks with community structure 
or sparse networks18, small population size19–21, mobility of players22, assortative interaction among players23, and 
a population variant of tit-for-tat24. The reputation-based reciprocity is the other form of indirect reciprocity in 
which those who have cooperated receive a good reputation and individuals would cooperate with those with 
good reputations. Reputation-based cooperation has also been widely observed in humans in laboratory experi-
ments25–28 and online society29,30, and also in cleaner fish31,32. However, differently from pay-it-forward reciproc-
ity, reputation-based indirect reciprocity has strategic rationality and is theoretically stable as payoff-maximizing 
behavior14,33,34.
In this paper, contrary to the previous empirical studies6–12,35–39, we demonstrate that the ability of 
pay-it-forward reciprocity to produce a chain of good-will on a large scale is fairly limited as compared to that 
of reputation-based reciprocity. In particular, we show that a chain of cooperation sustained by pay-it-forward 
reciprocity, but not by reputation-based reciprocity, is transient when an individual is made to act repeatedly. To 
this end, we carried out laboratory experiments in which each participant was engaged in long chains of behavior 
in two types of indirect reciprocity games. The participants submitted decisions many times, and we observed 
dynamics of their behavior. Chains of cooperation sustained by reputation-based reciprocity are expected to 
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emerge robustly in such a situation because it is payoff-maximizing behavior14,33,34. On the contrary, we postulate 
that a chain of good-will counting on pay-it-forward reciprocity, which is not strategically rational behavior16–24, 
will gradually disappear as participants accumulate decisions over time.
Results
Time series of cooperation in the two indirect reciprocity games. Participants played chained ver-
sions of the pay-it-forward reciprocity game and reputation-based reciprocity game in a group of 17 or 19 par-
ticipants. In both games, each participant either donated (i.e., cooperate, denoted by C) or did not donate (i.e., 
defect, denoted by D) the money received by the experimenter to the downstream neighbor in the chain (Fig. 1). 
If the participant selected C, he/she lost the money and the neighbor received the doubled amount of money. 
If the participant selected D, he/she kept the money and the neighbor received nothing. The participants made 
decisions many times (maximum 45 times per participant) in each of the two games in anonymous situations. We 
refer to each decision opportunity as the round; for example, round three indicates that each participant submits 
a decision for the third time. In the pay-it-forward game, each participant (except for the first participant in a 
chain) was informed of the previous decision made by the upstream neighbor toward the participant (Fig. 1(a)). 
In the reputation-based game, each participant was informed of the decision made by the downstream neighbor 
toward its downstream neighbor (Fig. 1(b)). See Methods for more details about the experimental procedure.
To examine the possibility of indirect reciprocity, we measure three types of probability of cooperation in each 
game. First, p(C) denotes the fraction of cooperation, which may depend on the participant and round. Second, 
p(C|C) and p(C|D) denote the fraction of cooperation right after the participant is informed of the C and D deci-
sions of the previous participant, respectively. It should be noted that p(C|C) and 1 − p(C|D) quantify the amount 
of positive and negative indirect reciprocity, respectively.
The probability of cooperation in each round averaged over all participants is shown in Fig. 2. In the 
pay-it-forward game, both unconditional (Fig. 2(a)) and conditional (Fig. 2(c,e)) probabilities of cooperation 
seem to decline over rounds, particularly in early rounds. However, in the reputation-based game, the probability 
of both unconditional (Fig. 2(b)) and conditional (Fig. 2(d,f)) cooperation is larger and stable over time.
Figure 2(b,d) indicate that p(C) and p(C|C) dropped in the last round in the reputation-based game, respec-
tively. This is because, in this game, participants who played in the last position in a chain of decisions were 
informed before making a decision that no upstream neighbor existed.
Determinants of cooperation in the two games - Statistical analysis. To examine patterns of indi-
rect reciprocity in pay-it-forward and reputation-based games, we conducted multivariate generalized linear 
mixed model (GLMM) analysis. Behavior was defined to be the sole binary dependent variable (D = 0, C = 1). 
We adopted the following three independent variables and their interactions. The decision of the previous par-
ticipant as a binary variable (D = 0, C = 1), the round as an integer valued variable (ranging from 1 to 45), and 
the game type as a binary variable (reputation-based game = 0, pay-it-forward game = 1). Indirect reciprocity is 
represented as the effect of the decision of the previous participant on the behavior of the current participant. If 
the indirect reciprocity is weakened or strengthened over time, the two-way interaction effect between the round 
and the decision of the previous participant should be significant. If the patterns of the indirect reciprocity differ 
between the two types of game, two- or three-way interaction effects involving the game type and the decision of 
the previous participant should be significant. Two more independent variables were entered as control variables. 
The first additional variable was the degree of pro-sociality, so-called social value orientation (SVO; pro-self = 0, 
pro-social = 1)40–42, which was determined by the questionnaires that the participants had gone through 1–2 
months before the experiment (see Methods and Supplementary Methods for details). The second additional var-
iable was the gender (female = 0, male = 1). The participant's ID (categorical values assigned to each participant, 
ranging from 1 to 131) was used as a random effect affecting the intercept. We assumed a binomial distribution 
with a logistic link function.
Figure 1. Schematic of the indirect reciprocity games. (a) Pay-it-forward game. (b) Reputation-based game. 
Each participant received random three-letter names.
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First, to examine whether the patterns of indirect reciprocity vary between the two types of game, we con-
structed 16 different models in which each of the four possible two- or three-way interaction terms was switched 
on or off. The four possible interaction terms were “decision of the previous participant x round”, “decision of the 
previous participant x game type”, “round x game type”, and “decision of the previous participant x round x game 
type”. We carried out the GLMM analysis for each of the 16 models and compared the values of Akaike’s informa-
tion criterion (AIC) (Supplementary Table S2). The best model (AIC = 9035.7) included the two two-way interac-
tion effects except the “decision of the previous participant x round” and also included the three-way interaction 
effect. The three-way interaction (i.e., decision of the previous participant x round x game type) was significant 
(odds ratio = .99, P = 0.01; Supplementary Table S3) in the best model. This result suggests that the patterns of 
indirect reciprocity vary between the two types of game.
Next, to reveal the difference between the two games, we conducted GLMM analysis separately for each 
type of game, where “decision of the previous participant x round” was the sole two-way interaction term. The 
results are shown in Table 1. The two-way interaction was significant in the pay-it-forward game but not in 
the reputation-based game. Furthermore, in the pay-it-forward game, we obtained the following results. First, 
cooperation significantly decreased as the round progressed. Second, if we neglected the effect of the round, 
the decision of the previous participant did not significantly affect the current participant’s decision. Third, the 
pro-sociality of participant significantly increased the probability of cooperation compared to the pro-selves. 
Fourth, the participant's gender did not affect behavior. Separate analysis indicated that p(C|C) was significantly 
larger than p(C|D) in the first and second rounds but they were not different in the subsequent rounds in the 
pay-it-forward game (Supplementary Table S4). Pay-it-forward reciprocity behavior was only significant in the 
first two rounds. This result is consistent with casual observations made with Fig. 2(a,c,e) and with the presence 
of the “decision of the previous participant x round” two-way interaction (Table 1). Taken together, cooperation 
as pay-it-forward reciprocity is a transient phenomenon.
In contrast to the pay-it-forward game, in the reputation-based game, the probability of cooperation when the 
previous player had cooperated was significantly larger than that when the previous player had defected (Table 1). 
Separate analysis confirmed that p(C|C) was significantly larger than p(C|D) in most of the rounds in the 
reputation-based game (Supplementary Table S4). These results are consistent with those shown in Fig. 2(b,d,f), 
which show that p(C|C) is larger than p(C|D) throughout the experiment. Therefore, reputation-based indirect 
Figure 2. Time courses of the fraction of cooperation averaged over all participants. A round corresponds 
to one decision made by each participant (e.g., the third round implies the third decision made by each 
participant in the entire game). (a) p(C) in the pay-it-forward game, (b) p(C) in the reputation-based game, 
(c) p(C|C) in the pay-it-forward game, (d) p(C|C) in the reputation-based game, (e) p(C|D) in the pay-it-
forward game, and (f) p(C|D) in the reputation-based game. The error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals 
(± 1.96 × SE).
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reciprocity behavior (i.e., C after observing C and D after observing D) was persistent over time in our exper-
iments. Pro-sociality did not affect the probability to cooperate. Males cooperated more than females, but this 
effect was marginal. The effect of the round was insignificant, consistent with observations made with Fig. 2(b,d,f).
Two remarks are in order. First, for each type of game, we also analyzed the univariate GLMM to find that 
the results were consistent with those for the multivariate GLMM shown in Table 1; the results for the univariate 
analysis are shown in Supplementary Table S5. Second, in fact, the participants in the same group influenced each 
other such that responses of different participants in the same group may be correlated. We confirmed that all 
the results held true even when the group was added as a second random effect in the GLMMs (Supplementary 
Table S6).
To strengthen our conclusions, we also compared p(C), p(C|C), and p(C|D) aggregated over the rounds and 
participants between the two games. We conducted three GLMM analyses. In each analysis, p(C), p(C|C), or 
p(C|D) was used as a dependent variable, the game type (reputation-based game = 0, pay-it-forward game = 1) as 
an independent variable, and both the individual and the group as random effects, assuming the normal distribu-
tion. The effect of game type was significant when we used p(C), or p(C|C) as the dependent variable (p(C): coef-
ficient = − 0.20, P < 0.01; p(C|C): coefficient = − 0.29, P < 0.01). Both p(C) and p(C|C) were significantly larger 
in the reputation-based game than in the pay-it-forward game (p(C), pay-it-forward: Mean = 0.42, SD = 0.34; 
reputation-based: Mean = 0.62, SD = 0.32; p(C|C), pay-it-forward: Mean = 0.42, SD = 0.38; reputation-based: 
Mean = 0.71, SD = 0.34). However, the effect of game type was not significant when we used p(C|D) as the 
dependent variable (coefficient = − 0.05, P = 0.15). We found no significant difference between p(C|D) in 
the pay-it-forward game and that in the reputation-based game (pay-it-forward: Mean = 0.42, SD = 0.39; 
reputation-based: Mean = 0.47, SD = 0.38).
Finally, we examined the degree of reciprocity defined by
= ( ) − ( ). ( )R p pC C C D 1
A participant with a large R value tends to show both positive reciprocity (C after C) and negative reciprocity 
(D after D). We conducted a GLMM analysis using the R value as a dependent variable and the game type as an 
independent variable, and found that the effect of game was significant (coefficient = − 0.23, P < 0.01). The R 
value averaged over the participants was significantly larger in the reputation-based than the pay-it-forward game 
(pay-it-forward: Mean = 0.004, SD = 0.38; reputation-based: Mean = 0.23, SD = 0.33).
In summary, cooperation as pay-it-forward reciprocity quickly declines over time. With the data aggregated 
over time, we have found that cooperation in the pay-it-forward reciprocity does not occur as indirect reciproc-
ity but is sustained by pro-sociality of the participant. We also tested effects of pro-sociality of the participants 
on pay-it-forward reciprocity to find that the “decision of the previous participant x SVO” two-way interaction 
was only marginally significant (Supplementary Table S7). Therefore, pro-sociality was not considered to cause 
pay-it-forward behavior. In contrast to the pay-it-forward game, cooperation in the reputation-based game was 
persistent and occured as indirect reciprocity.
Dependence on participants. To take a closer look at individual differences in the observed behavior, we 
calculated probabilities of cooperation for each participant and examined correlation of the probabilities between 
the two games. The relationship between p(C) in the pay-it-forward game, calculated for each participant, and 
p(C) in the reputation-based game is shown in Fig. 3(a). A circle represents a participant. The p(C) value is posi-
tively correlated between the two games (Pearson’s r = 0.50, N = 131, P < 0.01).
Odds ratio 95 % CI P-value
Pay-it-forward
 Decision of the previous participant (D = 0, C = 1) 1.290 0.939 – 1.771 0.116
 SVO (pro-self = 0, pro-social = 1) 7.510 2.035 – 27.716 0.002
 Gender (female = 0, male = 1) 0.776 0.220 – 2.736 0.693
 Round 0.977 0.968 – 0.985 0.000
 Decision of the previous participant × Round 0.986 0.974 – 0.998 0.024
 Intercept 0.200 0.063 – 0.635 0.006
Reputation-based
 Decision of the previous participant (D = 0, C = 1) 8.481 5.913 – 12.164 < 0.001
 SVO (pro-self = 0, pro-social = 1) 1.290 0.384 – 4.338 0.681
 Gender (female = 0, male = 1) 2.863 0.872 – 9.397 0.083
 Round 0.998 0.988 – 1.009 0.777
 Decision of the previous participant × Round 0.993 0.979 – 1.007 0.333
 Intercept 0.482 0.164 – 1.419 0.186
Table 1.  Results of the multivariate GLMM analysis separately for each type of game with a two-way 
interaction term. The dependent variable was the participant’s decision (0 = D, 1 = C). We excluded the 
participants whose pro-sociality could not be classified and those who did not report the gender. We confirmed 
that all VIF values were less than 10.
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We found that p(C|C) and p(C|D) were also correlated between the two games (p(C|C): Fig. 3(b), Pearson’s 
r = 0.44, N = 131, P < 0.01; p(C|D): Fig. 3(c), Pearson’s r = 0.42, N = 131, P < 0.01). However, each of p(C|C) and 
p(C|D) was not correlated between the two games when we regressed out the effect of p(C) (p(C|C): Pearson’s 
r = 0.07, N = 131, P = 0.43; p(C|D): Pearson’s r = 0.12, N = 131, P = 0.19; see Methods for the definition). 
Therefore, the degree of reciprocal cooperation was not correlated between the two games when the effect of 
unconditional probability of cooperation (i.e., p(C)) was controlled away. Consistent with these results, the R val-
ues calculated separately for each participant were not significantly correlated between the two games (r = 0.10, 
N = 131, P = 0.25; Supplementary Fig. S2).
Figure 3. The relationship between the probability of cooperation in the pay-it-forward game and that in 
the reputation-based game. A circle represents a participant. The solid lines represent the linear regression. 
(a) p(C), (b) p(C|C), and (c) p(C|D).
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Contagion of cooperation and defection. Previous empirical studies and field observations suggested 
that cooperative or defective behavior was contagious1–5,9,11,43. To address this issue within our data, we modeled 
successions of cooperation and those of defection on the chain of participants as simple stochastic processes that 
neglected individuality of the participants. We define the length of cooperation as the number of C that succes-
sively occurs before a D occurs. For example, if a participant that received/observed defection cooperates, the 
next two participants also cooperate, and the subsequent participant defects (i.e., …DCCCD…), the length of C 
is equal to three. The length of defection is defined in the same manner.
The frequencies of the length of C and that of D are shown for each type of game in Fig. 4. If the decision is 
independent of the participant and round (i.e., independently and identically distributed, or i.i.d.), the length of 
C and that of D obey the geometrical distribution given by
( ) = ( − ), ( )k p pPr 1 2k
where k is the length of C or D. The maximum likelihood estimator for the length of C and D is given by = ( )p p C  
and = ( )p p D , respectively. The estimated geometric distributions are drawn by the solid lines in Fig. 4 (hidden 
under the dashed lines in Fig. 4(a,c)). Figure 4(a,c) correspond to the length of C and D in the pay-it-forward 
game, respectively. In these figures, the empirical distributions did not significantly deviate from the geometrical 
distributions given by equation (2) (length of C:, KS test, D = 0.01, P = 1.00; length of D: KS test, D = 0.02, 
P = 0.89). Therefore, the results do not support contagion of cooperation or defection beyond the expectation of 
i.i.d. sequences. In contrast, in the reputation-based game, the empirical distribution of the length of C and that 
of D, shown by the bars in Fig. 4(b,d), respectively, significantly deviated from those of the geometrical distribu-
tions shown by the solid lines (length of C: KS test, D = 0.13, P < 0.01; length of D: KS test, D = 0.14, P < 0.01). 
Therefore, the succession of C and D observed in the reputation-based game is not explained under the assump-
tion of independent decision making.
Next, we considered a second model in which the participants independently use participant-independent 
conditional probabilities p(C|C) and p(C|D) to make decisions. Under this assumption, the decisions are gener-
ated by the Markov chain with two states, C and D (Supplementary Fig. S5). The theoretical distribution of the 
length of C and that of D in this case is given by the geometrical distribution (equation  (2)) with 
= ( ) = .p p C C 0 71 and = − ( ) = .p p1 C D 0 53, respectively (Supplementary Methods). The geometrical dis-
tributions estimated on the basis of the two-state Markov chain are shown by the dashed lines in Fig. 4. In the 
pay-it-forward game, the two-state Markov chain (dashed lines) and the i.i.d. model (solid lines) yielded indistin-
guishable results. In the reputation-based game, for both the length of C and that of D, the geometrical distribu-
tions derived from the two-state Markov chain (dashed lines) were different from those derived from the i.i.d. 
model (solid lines), and the former distributions captured the empirical distributions within insignificant error 
(length of C: KS test, D = 0.04, P = 0.55; length of D: KS test, D = 0.03, P = 0.91). Therefore, we conclude that 
indirect reciprocity behavior, which corresponds to the two-state Markov chain, is necessary for explaining suc-
cession of C and D observed in the reputation-based game.
Discussion
We investigated the effects of two types of indirect reciprocity – pay-it-forward and reputation-based reciprocity 
– on contagion of cooperation. The participants were embedded in long chains and made decisions many times 
toward anonymous others. In the reputation-based game, the fraction of cooperation was relatively large and 
stable across rounds. Cooperation of previous participants significantly increased the focal player’s cooperation, 
consistent with previous theoretical14,33,34 and experimental results25–28. Even selfish (pro-self) players tended 
to cooperate to maintain their reputations. This behavioral correlation (i.e., C after C and D after D) resulted 
in longer successions of C and D in chains of participants than in the hypothetical case in which participants 
independently made decisions. In the pay-it-forward game, we did not find reciprocal behavior or successions 
of C and D longer than expected from the case of independent decisions. This result is consistent with theoret-
ical results indicating that cooperation based on pay-it-forward reciprocity is not sustainable on its own15–24,44. 
Exclusively in this game, the pro-sociality of participants significantly promoted cooperation. Cooperation and 
its ostensible contagion were sustained by inclination of some participants to unconditional cooperation, not by 
reciprocity. The fraction of cooperation also declined over rounds in the pay-it-forward game.
Much of extant empirical evidence is in favor of pay-it-forward reciprocity. In fact, such evidence does not 
contradict the present results. First, each participant submitted a decision just once in many previous experi-
ments6–8,10,36,45 and field observations1–5 showing pay-it-forward reciprocity. The participants in the present study 
also showed pay-it-forward reciprocity behavior in the first two rounds.
Second, pay-it-forward reciprocity was found to endure even when the same participants made decisions 
repeatedly in previous experiments35,37. In these experiments, participants were formed in fixed short cycles com-
posed of three or four individuals. In this situation, the participants might have felt that their cooperative actions 
would be reimbursed through chained reactions of cooperation, which is consistent with the theoretical result 
that pay-it-forward reciprocity is viable on short cycles19–21. Cooperation on the basis of pay-it-forward reciproc-
ity in small groups is a strategically sensible choice. In contrast, we used groups of 17 or 19 anonymized partici-
pants that were placed on chains. Therefore, the participants would not be able to feel that they were embedded 
in short cycles. Under this circumstance, pay-it-forward reciprocity occurred only in initial rounds. However, we 
do not exclude the possibility that our group size is still too small to observe significant pay-it-forward behavior. 
The participants may have felt that they were playing in a relatively small group. Then, they may have tried to act 
strategically, not in a pay-it-forward manner.
Third, two other experimental studies revealed behavior similar to pay-it-forward reciprocity. Fowler and 
Christakis reported contagion of cooperation in the public goods game where participants interacted in groups 
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that were randomly and independently created in different rounds9. Grujić et al. conducted experiments with the 
prisoner’s dilemma game and a random matching protocol to find considerable cooperation under some condi-
tions (i.e., when the focal participant cooperated last time)46. These results seem to contradict our argument that 
pay-it-forward reciprocity is unstable in a long run. Although unclear, we postulate that the difference has arisen 
from the fact that a participant has interacted with multiple others in a round in the previous experiments. In 
every round, a participant was engaged in the public goods game with three other participants9 or the prisoner’s 
dilemma game with each of four other participants46. In contrast, participants in our experiment observed the 
behavior of only a single peer in every round.
We are not the first to report instability of pay-it-forward reciprocity. Experiments conducted on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk yielded no47 or weak11 evidence of pay-it-forward reciprocity. High sensitivity of the degree of 
pay-it-forward reciprocity to experimental methods reported in a previous study8 is also consistent with instabil-
ity of pay-it-forward reciprocity. Relative to these studies, the contribution of the present study is to have shown 
that cooperation as pay-it-forward reciprocity quickly decays in time and pro-sociality, not reciprocity, drives 
cooperation.
We showed that reputation-based reciprocity was more stable than pay-it-forward reciprocity. In fact, 
reputation-based reciprocity needs a system to monitor behavior of members and share their reputations in the 
community48–50. Pay-it-forward reciprocity, however, does not require such a system. Therefore, pay-it-forward 
reciprocity may remain a viable mechanism to yield cooperation, though transient, when reputation management 
systems are unavailable.
Since when Adam Smith51 and David Hume52 discussed roles of moral emotions as a basis of moral judgments 
and behavior, emotions such as empathy, shame, guilt, and gratitude, are argued to be a core proximate mecha-
nism underlying human cooperation53,54. In particular, cooperation in one-shot and anonymous situations, which 
does not provide any material benefit to actors, may be driven by moral55 or positive emotions56, intervening 
Figure 4. Frequencies of the length of cooperation and that of defection. The bars represent empirical 
frequencies. There were some samples that had run lengths larger than ten and hence were not shown in each 
panel. The solid and dashed curves represent the geometric distributions estimated based on the i.i.d. and 
Markov assumptions, respectively. (a,b) show the frequencies of the length of C in the pay-it-forward game and 
those in the reputation-based game, respectively. In (a), both solid and dashed lines are based on p ≈ 0.42. In 
(b), the solid line is based on p = 0.60, and the dashed line is based on p = 0.71. (c,d) show the frequencies of the 
length of D in the pay-it-forward game and those in the reputation-based game, respectively. In (c), both solid 
and dashed lines are based on p ≈ 0.58. In (d), the solid line is based on p = 0.40, and the dashed line is based on 
p = 0.53. The solid and dashed lines almost completely overlap in (a,c).
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cost-benefit calculus possibly made by actors. Emotions are also contagious57. Positive emotion of gratitude may 
strengthen social relationships58,59 and play a key role in nurturing strong bonds in a society60,61. With these lines 
of evidence combined, a possible interpretation of the present results on pay-it-forward reciprocity is that it 
occurs via positive emotions. Previous psychological7,45,60–62 and neuroimaging63 studies showed that cooperation 
occurring as pay-it-forward reciprocity or contagion was induced by positive emotions such as gratitude and 
empathy. This interpretation is consistent with a transient nature of pay-it-forward reciprocity shown in the pres-
ent study; positive emotions were shown to be transient in other experiments using different paradigms62. Moral 
emotions undoubtedly underlie moral behavior of humans. However, a chain of one-shot cooperation sustained 
by moral emotions may be fragile when people frequently make decisions. It is an important question to examine 
limits and potentials of moral emotions as a fundament of cooperative human society.
Methods
Ethics statements. The present research was approved by the ethic committee of the National Institute of 
Informatics, Japan and the Center for Experimental Research in Social Sciences at Hokkaido University, Japan. 
Participants read and signed informed consent forms before participating. The experiments were carried out in 
accordance with the approved guideline.
Participants. Participants were 131 undergraduate students at Hokkaido University in Japan. They were 
recruited from a large participant pool via e-mail. The participants received monetary rewards depending on 
the performance in the game. Participants formed a group of 17 or 19 participants, and there were seven groups. 
Supplementary Table S1 shows detailed information about individual groups.
Procedures. Upon arrival, participants were escorted into a lecture room which had a seating capacity of at 
least 30 people. Each participant sat in front of a tablet computer. The partitions between adjacent participants 
prohibited them from seeing each other’ face and the display of the tablet computer. Once all participants sat, an 
experimenter gave instructions about the experiment using audible slides. The participants also received a written 
summary of the instructions, which was put on the desk during the experiment. They were told that the anonym-
ity of their decisions was secured throughout the experiment.
Each participant played both the pay-it-forward and the reputation-based games. The order of games was 
counterbalanced. Before each game started, the participants answered a questionnaire regarding the rule of the 
games. Those answering incorrectly were led to the correct answers by the experimenter, who mentioned the 
corresponding part of the written instructions to the participants. Each type of game started after all participants 
answered the questions correctly after possible corrections. After finishing all rounds of both games, the partici-
pants were individually paid according to the results of the two games. A participant received 1,236 Japanese yen 
(about 9.9 US dollars; 1 yen ≈ 0.008 US dollars) on average. It took about 90 minutes for a participant to finish 
both games.
Games. The participants played two types of chained gift-giving games. Five pairs of participants were ran-
domly selected from the group without overlap. One participant in each pair was assigned to a role of donor, and 
the other to a role of recipient with the equal probability (i.e., a half). The donor was given 10 yen (about 8 US 
cents) from the experimenter and then decided whether or not to donate it. If the donor donated, he/she was left 
with no money, whereas the recipient received the doubled amount (i.e., 20 yen). If the donor did not donate, he/
she kept 10 yen, and the recipient did not receive anything. The participants submitted decisions through a tablet 
PC (Windows Surface Pro 2, Microsoft 256 GB, 94X-00012). The PCs were connected via a Wi-Fi network. The 
experimental software was developed using z-Tree64.
The participants were embedded in a chain and sequentially made decisions. Figure 1(a) schematically repre-
sents the decision flow in the pay-it-forward game. Player X is informed of player W’s decision (donate the 10 yen, 
i.e., C, or do not donate, i.e., D). Then, player X makes a decision toward player Y, X’s decision is revealed to Y, 
Y makes a decision toward Z, and so on. Figure 1(b) represents the decision flow in the reputation-based game. 
Player X is informed of W’s decision toward V. Then, X makes a decision toward W, X’s decision is revealed to Y, 
Y makes a decision toward X, and so on (also see Supplementary Figs. S3 and S4). We allocated the positions in 
the chain to the participants randomly in advance under the constraint that the participants were never paired 
with same partners as both upstream and downstream neighbors more than once in a single chain. This proce-
dure was to exclude direct reciprocity. Each participant received a name composed of three randomly selected 
letters as shown in Fig. 1. The names of the participants near the focal participant in the chain were displayed 
on the screen of the focal participant (Supplementary Fig. S1). Once a participant submitted a decision, he/she 
received a new three-letter name, which was different from what he/she had previously received. In addition, we 
simultaneously ran five chains of decision, and each participant appeared in different chains. Although each par-
ticipant never paired with same neighbors within each chain, they may play with the same players in a different 
chain. To assure anonymity, each participant also received different three-letter names in different chains (see 
Supplementary Method for details). Aside from the three-letter names, each participant was assigned a 7-digit 
identification that did not change throughout the experiment. The history of decisions of each participant was 
tracked with his/her 7-digit number, and the payment to each participant was calculated. We ran five chains to 
accelerate the experiments and prevent the participants from getting tired in later rounds.
For example, in a group of 19 participants, each participant submitted decisions nine times, each toward a 
different peer, in each of simultaneously running chains. When all participants finished nine decisions in each 
chain, the game (either the pay-it-forward or reputation-based game) terminated. Thus, each participant made 
decisions nine times per chain. We defined the round as the number of decisions that a participant made in each 
type of game, regardless of the chain in which the participant responded (Supplementary Fig. S4). For example, 
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if a participant made decisions six times in each of the five chains and was about to make the seventh deci-
sion in one of the chains, the participant was in the 31st round. Because we simultaneously ran five chains (see 
Supplementary method for details), a participant made 45 decisions (i.e., rounds) in each game. In fact, some 
participants experienced fewer rounds in the case of smaller groups (with 17 participants) and computer troubles. 
Supplementary Table S1 shows the lengths of decision chains for all groups. Participants were informed of the 
structure of the simultaneously running chains of decisions before the experiment.
Measurement of pro-sociality. We quantified pro-sociality of the participants with a social value orienta-
tion (SVO)40–42. The SVO is known to be correlated with the tendency to cooperate in social dilemma situations65. 
We measured the SVO with the so-called triple dominance method42 one or two months prior to the experiment. 
When participants registered to the participant pool, they were asked to answer SVO questionnaires in addition 
to personal information such as the gender.
In the questionnaires, the participants were asked to imagine that they would share money with an unknown 
person who they had not met before and would not meet again in the future. They chose the most preferred option 
among the following three alternatives, i.e., pro-social, individualistic, and competitive alternatives. Among the 
three alternatives, the pro-social option provides the largest joint outcome, i.e., the sum of the money that the par-
ticipant and the unknown person receive (e.g., 500 yen to the self and 500 yen to the partner). The individualistic 
option provides the largest outcome to the participant (e.g., 550 yen to the self and 300 yen to the partner). The 
competitive option provides the largest difference between the two persons (e.g., 500 yen to the self and 100 yen 
to the partner). Each participant answered such questions nine times (see Supplementary method for the values 
used in the nine questions). Those who selected at least six consistent options were classified as pro-social, indi-
vidualist, or competitor. Individualists and competitors were combined into one category to be called pro-self 
participants because of the small sample size of competitor40,41. In fact, only three among 131 participants were 
competitors. Eighty and 35 participants were classified as pro-social and pro-self, respectively. Sixteen partici-
pants were not classified because they made inconsistent choices or did not answer the questionnaires.
Conditional and unconditional probabilities of cooperation. We calculated the unconditional and 
conditional probabilities of cooperation as follows:
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where nCD is the total number of defection selected right after the neighbor’s cooperation. nCC, nDC, and nDD are 
similarly defined. We calculated p(C), p(C|C), and p(C|D) by aggregating the data over the participants and/or 
rounds depending on the analysis.
GLMM. We conducted all analysis using R 3.0.2. Each participant belonged to a group of 17 or 19 persons, and 
submitted their decisions many times. Decisions by the same participant are not independent. In order to statisti-
cally adjust for the effect of these repeated measures, we needed to consider a hierarchical model for analysis. We 
conducted analysis using a GLMM by using the glmer function implemented in package lme4 in R 3.0.2. In the 
GLMM analysis, we added a random effect for each participant affecting the intercept. An example of a GLMM 
logistic regression model with m independent variables is given by
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where i reperesents the participant [1–131], j represents the round [1–45], and qi,j is a probability that a partici-
pant i cooperates in the in the jth round. xm’,i,j is the value of an independent variable, β m’ is the coefficient for the 
fixed effect of the independent variable, β 0 is an intercept, and ri represents the random effect nested within each 
participant. The random effect was assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. We estimated β 0, β m’, and 
ri using the maximum likelihood method assuming the binomial distribution.
Correlation between conditional probabilities of cooperation in the two games. We calculated 
the correlation between p(C|C) in the two games with the effect of p(C) controlled as follows. First, we linearly 
regressed p(C) in the pay-it-forward game on p(C|C) in the pay-it-forward game and calculated the residual for 
each individual. Second, we regressed p(C) in the reputation-based game on p(C|C) in the reputation-based game 
and calculated the residual. The residual value represents the tendency of cooperation that is not predicted by 
unconditional cooperation. Third, we calculated the correlation coefficient between the residual values in the two 
games by regarding that a participant represents a data point. The correlation coefficient between p(C|D) in the 
two games was similarly calculated.
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